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Abstract
I present a mechanism that relies on the interaction of coordination and am-
biguity (Knightian uncertainty) and makes precise how a loss of confidence can
arise in loan markets, leading to a systemic liquidity crisis. The paper studies a
simple global-game coordination model among lenders to a financial intermedi-
ary and shows how a market haircut arises in equilibrium. I show how the hair-
cut responds to a variety of parameters. In particular, I show that coordination is
non-robust to ambiguity in investor signals and becomes fragile in an environment
with ambiguity. This leads to the haircut jumping up suddenly, possibly to 100%
when enough lenders are ambiguity-sensitive. Further, I show that the fragility
of coordination implies that in such an environment, policy itself becomes a sys-
temic trigger. If the regulator fails to rescue an institution that the market expects
to be saved, which in turn changes market expectation about policy for other in-
stitutions even slightly, an immediate systemic collapse of liquidity ensues. The
results explain both the contagious run on liquidity markets at the advent of the
recent crisis as well as the liquidity market freeze after the Lehman collapse. While
what matters for the possibility run is whether an institution is too-unexpected-to-
fail (TUTF), it is likely that institutions typically considered too-big-to-fail (TBTF)
are also likely to be TUTF. The results then show that TBTF institutions limit the
spread of crises, and breaking up a TBTF increases systemic vulnerability. Further,
the results cast some doubt on the efficacy of the ring-fencing policy proposed by
the UK banking commission.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: G2, C7, E5.
KEYWORDS: Short-term debt, systemic liquidity crises, coordination, ambiguity,
bail-out policy, liquidity policy
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1 Introduction
The financial markets experienced multiple rounds of systemic liquidity runs during
the last crisis. As Gorton and Metrick (2012) show, with the arrival of bad news from
housing markets in 2007, there was a run on the repo market which spread from sub-
prime housing assets to non-subprime assets with no direct connection to the housing
market. A similar run took place in the asset-backed commercial paper market, even
for paper not exposed to subprime mortgages (see Covitz, Liang and Suarez (2009)).
Further, a widespread freeze of liquiditymarkets followed the failure of Lehman Broth-
ers in September 2008. A run ensued on money-market mutual funds as well and the
interbank market was severely disrupted.1 To understand the crisis it is important to
explain why runs spread to non-subprime assets, and why a systemic liquidity crisis
arose immediately after the Lehman failure.
I provide a theory based on the interaction of lender coordination and ambiguity (Knigh-
tian uncertainty) to explain the origins contagion runs in liquidity markets. Further, I
show how the interaction of policy with coordination and ambiguity can give rise to a
sudden systemic liquidity freeze. Gorton (2012) defines systemic risk as loss of investor
confidence in financial intermediary debt. The interaction of coordination, ambiguity
and policy shown here clarifies a mechanism through which such a loss of confidence
arises and makes the meaning of loss of confidence precise. This is the main contribu-
tion of this paper.
I study a simple global game model of coordination among lenders lending short-term
funds to a financial intermediary, and calculate the equilibrium market haircut (the
fraction of funds that the intermediary must put up in order to successfully attract
enough funds to run an investment project). I show how haircut responds to different
parameters and how coordination itself gives rise to an inefficiency. I then show that
if lenders are ambiguity averse, the introduction of any (arbitrarily small) degree of
ambiguity about the signal received by lenders leads to a complete breakdown of co-
ordination and the market haircut rises to 100%. In other words, coordination is fragile
with respect to ambiguity and therefore even the smallest degree of ambiguity gives
1The Libor-OIS spread, historically around 10 basis points, spiked sharply to above 50 basis points
in August 2007 and then to an all-time high of 364 basis points just after the Lehman failure, indicating
severe stress on the interbank markets.
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rise to a liquidity run. Thus the advent of ambiguity in the presence of coordination
requirements in rolling over loans explains runs across subprime related as well as
unrelated repo markets.
The systemic collapse of liquidity does not require all lenders to be affected by ambigu-
ity. I show that if the fraction of lenders affected by ambiguity exceeds the fraction of
the project that can be funded by own stable funds, coordination collapses completely
if any ambiguity is introduced. If the former fraction is below the latter one, the market
haircut rises sharply when ambiguity is introduced, but not to 100%.
The problem above does not arise for a financial intermediary if the market expects it to
be rescued by policymakers, i.e. given lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) support (through-
out the paper, the terms rescue, bail-out and LOLR support are used interchangebly).
For such an intermediary, coordination ceases to be an issue as LOLR support covers
any funds not rolled over. It follows that the collapse-of-coordination cannot happen.
However, this immunity depends entirely on policymakers following market expecta-
tions about institutions that are too-unexpected-to-fail (TUTF). If policy does not fol-
low market expectations so that the latter adjusts even slightly, a complete collapse
of liquidity arises through the interaction of coordination and ambiguity as described
above. Thus policy itself becomes a potential trigger of systemic crisis. This offers an
explanation of the tightening of credit terms for other large financial intermediaries
and runs on even the money market funds in the wake of the Lehman failure. Such
intermediaries and funds are typically perceived as safe (i.e. the market implicitly as-
sumes they will receive LOLR support), but as we show, even a small change in this
expectation is enough to explain these runs.
The results also show that avoiding systemic risk implies that the following three
things cannot co-exist: (1) short-term debt not covered by public guarantees (2) any
factor (such as complex financial innovation that makes the exposure of an intermedi-
ary to loss opaque) that is likely to introduce some (even small) degree of ambiguity in
investors’ signals of fundamentals, and (3) policy making that is market-independent
in the sense that the regulator does not rescue an institution that the market expects to
be rescued. In other words, the presence of rollover risk and ambiguity imply that the
extent of bail-out policy is determined entirely by market expectations.
If the market expects an institution to fail under a liquidity run, it follows that at the
advent of ambiguity in signals about returns, such an institution would experience a
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liquidity run. If, on the other hand, the market expects an institution not to fail (a TUTF
institution), it does not experience a liquidity run unless policy itself contributes to any
lowering of expectations about rescue probability. It follows that, so long as policy
conforms to market expectations, having a TUTF institution helps limit the spread of a
liquidity crisis.
While our work shows the importance of considering market expectations, a different
issue, much discussed in the literature, is the consequence of a financial institution
being too big to fail (TBTF). What does our work imply about the notion of TBTF? In
particular, does a large institution regarded as TBTF help with or exacerbate the crisis?
If market expectations about which institutions are likely to be rescued is unrelated
to size, TBTF would not matter. However, it is quite likely that markets expect large
institutions with complex counterparty obligations to be rescued. In this case, TBTF
coincides with TUTF, in which case having a TBTF institution is helpful in limiting the
systemic spread of a liquidity crisis. The same reasoning shows why breaking up a
TBTF institution exacerbates the systemic crisis. If broken up, none of the parts might
be TUTF, in which case all parts experience liquidity runs. This increases systemic
vulnerability. In the wake of the recent crisis, many policy proposals have called for
breaking up TBTF institutions. The discussion above implies such a policy may be
somewhat misplaced in promoting systemic stability.
The results here imply that there are two ways for regulatory policy to reduce the
systemic vulnerability to ambiguity. Any policy that reduces the coordination problem
helps improve the system’s defence against ambiguity. Further, any policy that creates
an expectation that an intermediary would be rescued in a crisis also has the same
effect. Requiring banks to fund projects fully or partially with stable funds (long term
debt, equity, insured deposits) - for example the net stable funding ratio of Basel III,
requiring banks to hold more liquid assets - for example the liquidity coverage ratio
requirement of Basel III belong to the first category. Explicit or implicit promise of
LOLR support belongs to the second.
In similar vein, the results suggest that systemic impact of the ring-fencing proposed
by the UK banking commission is questionable. Consider a bank that is TUTF in the
absence of ring-fencing. Indeed, ring-fencing is proposed for precisely large banks
with important network positions - and such banks are would typically be considered
by the market as TUTF. Placing a ring-fence now indicates to the market that the part
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outside the fence is unlikely to be rescued, which makes it vulnerable to the fragility
noted here, increasing systemic instability.
Let us now describe the modelling of coordination and ambiguity in the model in some
detail. We adopt a standard global game approach to model coordination among sev-
eral lenders lending short-term funds to a financial intermediary. We study a typical
three-period model. A project is initiated period 0 using short-term credit; funds must
be rolled over in period 1; if successfully rolled over, returns are realized in period 2.
If funds are not rolled over, there is a fire sale, and some return is realized depending
on the state of fundamentals. Hence coordination matters: if enough lenders roll-over
funds in period 1, the project earns a high expected return in period 2, and a lower
return otherwise. Each lender receives a signal of the state of fundamentals with some
noise. With a small amount of incomplete information, the game is dominance solv-
able: there is a unique equilibrium that is attained by iteratively eliminating strictly
dominated strategies. However, just as agents are almost, but not entirely sure of the
underlying state of fundamentals, if there is even the slightest ambiguity about the
signal being biased, and if the agents are ambiguity averse. coordination breaks down
completely. Agents lend successfully only when the underlying state of fundamentals
is so high that it is a dominant strategy to lend.
The intuition for this result is as follows. We model ambiguity using the maxmin ex-
pected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Suppose the signal bias lies in the
interval [−b, b] (where b is arbitrarily small). Agents consider the worst case in which
there is a bias of b in the signal. We show since an agent perceives a bias relative to oth-
ers’ signals, when signal noise is small, the agent’s optimal action is to calculate what
signal threshold y∗ others, who are perceived to receive unbiased signals, arrive at.
Then set own signal threshold at y∗ + b. In other words, the agent wants to stay away
from the threshold established by others. Note that this agent is not contributing to
coordination at all. The agent rolls over own funds only when others have established
a coordination threshold y∗, and then sets own threshold above y∗. But if everyone
(or, as I show, a large enough fraction) behaves this way–each trying to stay ahead of
the others–coordination necessarily fails. In this case rollover happens only when it is
a dominant strategy for each agent to roll over. In all other cases where coordination
matters, no one rolls over, i.e. there is a run on the project and it is liquidated.
Thus starting from a equilibrium with a coordination threshold, if even the slightest
5
degree of ambiguity is introduced and agents are ambiguity averse, a liquidity run
follows. Further, policy plays an important role in this process.
The results in this paper imply the following pattern of credit tightening for financial
intermediaries. For intermediaries with some exposure to non-performing assets (such
as subprime mortgage backed securities), lenders are likely to experience some signal
ambiguity. For such intermediaries, coordination breaks down or is impaired and the
cost of funds rise dramatically if the lenders perceive that a public bail-out is not likely.
However, if other policy measures again convince lenders that any liquidity problems
would be met with central bank liquidity support, coordination would be restored and
cost of borrowing would fall. For (possibly smaller, less interconnected) intermediaries
that are not expected to be rescued, cost of funds would rise dramatically at the advent
of crisis (and therefore, ambiguity) and stay high.
In their study of the fed funds market in the aftermath of the Lehman failure Afonso,
Kovner and Schoar (2011) find precisely this pattern: “...in the days immediately after
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy the market becomes more sensitive to bank-specific
characteristics, especially in the amounts lent to borrowers but also in the cost of
overnight funds. In particular, large banks with high percentages of non-performing
loans (NPLs) showed drastically reduced daily borrowing amounts and borrowed
from fewer counterparties in the days after Lehmans bankruptcy. However, begin-
ning on Tuesday, September 16, 2008, once the AIG bailout was announced, the trend
reversed, and spreads for the largest banks fell steeply . . . the same is not true for small
banks, which continued to face higher spreads.”
Indeed, the authors interpret the reduction spreads for large banks after the AIG bailout
as the effect of the governments support for systemically important banks. Our paper
provides a precise mechanism to articulate such an interpretation.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on global games, and shows that coordi-
nation is fragile to ambiguity in signals. Papers by ? and ? have studied the effect of
ambiguity in a 2-player global game with signal noise away from the limit. In these
models, a small degree of ambiguity has a small effect reducing coordination. We show
that when signal noise is small, coordination breaks down, and clarify the intuition be-
hind this result, namely, even a small degree of ambiguity results in each agent trying
to beat the coordination threshold of others, making coordination impossible.
Given the result on fragility of coordination to ambiguity, our theory can be used in
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general to understand the sudden collapse in any coordination-based market. Con-
sider, for example, the sudden collapse in the auction-rate securities market in the re-
cent crisis.2 While our model does not explicitly capture the institutional details of this
market, at the heart of these shadow-banking markets is investor coordination, and
our theory would suggest that the interaction of such coordination and ambiguity can
explain why a sudden failure can arise.
The theory of systemic spread of crisis from breakdown of coordination under ambi-
guity also fits with events in the Great Depression. In the new preface to 2012 edition
of Kindleberger (1973), DeLong and Eichengreen write:
The 1931 crisis began, as Kindleberger observes, in a relatively minor Eu-
ropean financial centre, Vienna, but when left untreated leapfrogged first
to Berlin and then, with even graver consequences, to London and New
York. This is the 20th centurys most dramatic reminder of quickly how fi-
nancial crises can metastasise almost instantaneously. In 1931 they spread
through a number of different channels. German banks held deposits in
Vienna. Merchant banks in London had extended credits to German banks
and firms to help finance the countrys foreign trade. In addition to financial
links, there were psychological links: as soon as a big bank went down in
Vienna, investors, having no way to know for sure, began to fear that sim-
ilar problems might be lurking in the banking systems of other European
countries and the US.
In the light of our theory, we can interpret the troubles in Vienna as creating some
ambiguity for lenders in other European countries as well as the US, leading to coor-
dination failure at these centres, ensuring a that the crisis was replicated across these
centres.
1.1 Relevant literature: A brief review
There is an extensive literature studying runs in financial markets. Here I briefly note
papers connected to this work. The most direct intellectual antecedent is the work
2See Han and Li (2010) for a detailed empirical investigation.
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of Rochet and Vives (2004). They study a global game coordination model of loan
rollover in the standard three-period framework. They show that it is possible to have
banks that are solvent but illiquid, and discuss policy fixes. This paper uses a simi-
lar framework and models the same problem and therefore the same result on illiquid
but solvent banks reappear here, namely when θ ∈ [θ, θ∗). However, our modelling
is a little different allowing a different focus: the derivation of a market haircut and
study the impact on this of the interaction between coordination with ambiguity, and
the ensuing impact of policies on systemic outcomes through the channel of market ex-
pectations. Our work also allows discussion of policies that serve as insurance against
ambiguity and an evaluation of the question of an intermediary being TBTF.
The question of market freezes has been studied by Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer
(2011). In their work, a freeze arises from the evolution of debt-capacity of assets in re-
peated rounds of rollovers. Here, the model is of a traditional “panic.” Since the sem-
inal work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), panics have been modeled as selecting the
“bad” equilibrium out multiple coordination equilibria. The global games approach
allows linking equilibrium choice to fundamentals, and derivation of a unique equi-
librium for every value of fundamentals. We adopt this approach and show that coor-
dination is fragile to ambiguity: even a small degree of ambiguity leads to a collapse
of coordination so that for all values of fundamentals where coordination matters, the
bad equilibrium is chosen.
Apart from this “panics” approach, there is a literature–largely developed since the
latest crisis–that focuses on a systemic amplification through spirals of asset price
movements (fire sales). Such movements lead to loss spirals and margin spirals work-
ing through the balance sheets to amplify a crisis (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009;
Adrian and Shin, 2010).3 Our work complements this approach in the sense that a
breakdown of coordination would lead to fire sales, and subsequent spirals of loss
could further exacerbate the problem.
? study a model with money market trade between regions that differ in access to
insured deposits, and show how this distorts the way money markets allocate funds
When risk of bank failure rises significantly, trade breaks down, which they interpret
as a market freeze. Here the motivation for a run is also counterparty risk, but arising
3See also Brunnermeier (2009) for an overview of the approach, and Shleifer and Vishny (2011) for a
discussion of fire sales in general.
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from incomplete information and ambiguity about such risk. Also, our result shows
that the system is fragile: even very small levels of ambiguity in signals leads to a
collapse of coordination, haircut jumping up, and sudden market freezes arising.
Finally, while I use ambiguity in signals about counterparty risk to show a market
freeze, the notion of ambiguity has been fruitfully employed in other strands of lit-
erature on crises. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) show ambiguity in the envi-
ronment combined with ambiguity aversion can give rise to liquidity hoarding in in-
terbank markets. Easley and OHara (2010) show markets can become illiquid when
traders face extreme Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity). Such ambiguity can be rep-
resented by incomplete preferences over portfolios, and show that no trade occurs at
equilibrium quotes.
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2 The model
There are three periods, 0, 1 and 2. The intermediary has a project that requires 1 unit
of funding initially and in period 1. In period 2 the returns are realized. If in period 1
investment by the intermediary falls below 1, the project must be liquidated. Instead
of this risky project, the intermediary can also invest in a riskless asset at the initial
period. We normalize the riskfree net return to 0.
There is a unit mass of potential lenders. Lenders are risk neutral. Each lender lends 1
unit of funds initially, and must decide in period 1 whether to rollover the unit to the
intermediary or to withdraw (wholly or partially) and invest in a safe asset that has a
net return of 0.
The return from the project as well as the liquidation value depends on the underlying
economic fundamentals θ. If 1 unit is invested in periods 0 and 1, the project returns θR
where R > 1. Here θ can be thought of as the probability of success of the project and
R the return if the project succeeds (the return if the project fails is 0 by implication).
The liquidation value depends on market liquidity. We assume that the liquidation
value is θ in state θ. In other words, the state of fundamentals also indicates the state
of market liquidity. As θ improves, two things happen: the return from the project
improves (the project succeeds with higher probability) and the market liquidity im-
proves, which implies that the proceeds from any early liquidation rises.
The balance sheet of the intermediary is as follows. On the liabilities side, apart from
short term borrowing of 1, the intermediary has access to stable funds (long term bor-
rowing, equity) of ψ ∈ [0, 1]. On the assets side, apart from the long term investment
of 1 unit of funds, it holds ψ in liquid form (cash, t-bills).
This implies that in period 1, so long as at least (1 − ψ) of short-term borrowing is
rolled over, the investment project can continue to period 2 since the intermediary can
fund up to ψ using the liquid funds.
If the project faces liquidation because of lack of funds, it is bailed-out by the policy-
maker with probability p. The policymaker supplies enough funds so that the project
continues till maturity and lenders get the same return of θR that they would get if
enough funds had been rolled over.
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2.1 The payoff of lenders and the intermediary
Let us nowderive the payoff of lenders, which is a function of the state of fundamentals
θ. Each lender lending a unit of funds is promised a payoff of r > 1 with limited
liability so long as the project succeeds.
Therefore the expected net return of a lender, denoted by piL(L(θ), θ), is given by
piL(L(θ), θ) =
θr− 1 if ψ + L(θ) > 1pθr + (1− p)θ − 1 otherwise
2.2 Dividing the set of fundamentals
If the state of the fundamentals θ were common knowledge, we could divide the set of
fundamentals as follows.
Let
θ =
1
pρ + (1− p)
(1)
For any θ > θ, the net expected return from rolling over is positive even if the project
is liquidated. Therefore rolling over is the dominant strategy in this case.
Next, let θ be such that θr = 1, which implies
θ =
1
r
(2)
For any θ < θ, the net expected return from rolling over is negative even if all others
roll over. Therefore not rolling over is the dominant strategy in this case.
For θ[θ, θ], whether investment proceeds depends on the size of the total funds raised.
In this interval a coordination problem arises, and would give rise to multiple equilib-
ria when θ is common knowledge.
2.3 Incomplete Information and Signals
The state of fundamentals θ is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1+
∆], ∆ > 0. Each lender receives a signal x of θ in period 1, where x is uniform on [θ −
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ε, θ + ε]. Conditional on the true state θ, the signals are independently and identically
distributed. After receiving the signal, lenders simultaneously decide whether to roll
over their loan or withdraw. The decisions made result in aggregate loan rollover of
L(θ).
Finally, a technical requirement. To ensure that the signal intervals are well defined at
the lower boundary of the relevant range of fundamentals, I assume that θ = 1/r > 2ε
and 1+ ∆ − θ > 2ε. Note that the latter is possible assuming ∆ > 2ε since θ is at most
1.
3 Equilibrium
I consider monotone equilibria (as I show later on, there are no other types of equilib-
ria). In a monotone equilibrium, there is a threshold x∗ such that agents roll over their
loan if and only if x > x∗. The aggregate size of the loan is the mass of agents who
receive x > x∗.Thus
L(θ) =

0 if θ < x∗ − ε,
θ + ε− x∗
2ε
if x∗ − ε 6 θ < x∗ + ε,
1 if θ > x∗ + ε.
Clearly, total investment increases in θ.
First, given any signal cutoff x∗, let us calculate the threshold θ∗ such that successful
investment occurs if and only if θ > θ∗. This is given by
L(θ∗) = 1− ψ (3)
Solving,
x∗ = (2ψ − 1)ε + θ∗ (4)
Next, given that the project earns a high return if and only if θ > θ∗, let us calculate the
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signal cutoff x∗. The expected payoff of an agent with signal x from a loan rollover is
V(θ∗, x) = Pr(θ > θ∗|x)E
(
θr|{θ > θ∗, x}
)
+ Pr(θ < θ∗|x)E
(
pθr + (1− p)θ|{θ < θ∗, x}
)
− 1,
=
1
2ε
∫ x+ε
θ∗
θr dθ +
1
2ε
∫ θ∗
x−ε
(pθr + (1− p)θ) dθ − 1,
=
1
4ε
(
(1− p)(r − 1)((x− ε)2 − θ2)) + xr− 1.
For any given θ∗, x∗ solves the indifference condition
V(θ∗, x∗) = 0. (5)
Using equation (4) to write x∗ in terms of θ∗, and substituting in the expression for
V(θ∗, x∗) from above, then using (5), we get a single equation in θ∗:
(1− p)(r − 1)
(
ε2 + (θ∗ + (2ψ − 1)ε)2 − θ∗2
)
4ε
+
1
2
(θ∗ + (2ψ − 1)ε)(1+ r+ p(r − 1))− 1 = 0
Solving, we get following (unique) rollover cutoff. The details of the derivation are
relegated to the appendix.
θ∗ =
1+ (1− ψ)2(1− p+ pr)ε− ψ2εr
r− (1− ψ)(1− p)(r − 1)
(6)
I show next that the unique monotone equilibrium identified above is also the only
equilibrium irrespective of the strategies considered. In particular, investing for and
only for x > x∗ is the only strategy that survives iterative elimination of strictly dom-
inated strategies. This dominance-solvability is similar to several other applications
of coordination games exhibiting strategic complementarities in payoffs. The proof is
exactly similar to the uniqueness proof in Morris and Shin (2003, 2004) and omitted.
Proposition 1. The monotone strategy of investing if and only if x > x∗ is the only strategy
that survives iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and therefore the equilibrium
in monotone strategies is the unique equilibrium.
Next, taking the limit as ε → 0, we get the rollover cutoff:
θ∗ =
1
r− (1− ψ)(1− p)(r − 1)
(7)
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At ψ = 0, θ∗ = 1 ≡ θ. Further, for ψ = 1 or p = 1, θ∗ = 1/r ≡ θ. Further, θ∗ is clearly
decreasing in ψ as well as p. It follows that for any 0 < ψ < 1 and/or 0 < p < 1,
θ < θ∗ < θ.
Note that θ∗ is decreasing in ψ, p and r. This is intuitive: higher provision of liquid
funds eases the coordination problem and thereby reduces the coordination threshold,
a greater chance of public rescue improves the payoff of lenders which in turn reduces
the coordination problem, and finally, a higher promised payment if the project suc-
ceeds has the same effect as a higher rescue probability.
3.1 Equilibrium Market Haircut
Themarket required stable funds for any state of fundamentals θ is theminimum stable
funding the intermediary must itself provide in order for successful coordination of
lending to take place. In other words, it is the minimum haircut to ensure that θ > θ∗.
Since θ∗ is decreasing in ψ, the haircut is smallest if we can ensure coordination is just
successful at θ. If we support coordination at θ by making θ > θ∗, we can lower the
intermediary’s own stable funding and still ensure that θ > θ∗. Therefore the market
haircut necessary to ensure θ > θ∗ is given by the solution for ψ to θ = θ∗, where θ∗ is
given by equation (7).
Solving, market required haircut for coordination to be successful at state θ is ψM(θ) is
given by
ψM(θ) = 1−
rθ − 1
(1− p)(r − 1)θ
3.2 Minimum Market Required Haircut
The market required haircut calculated above depends on the promised loan interest
factor r. This is presumably determined by supply and demand factors in the market
for funds outside the scope of the model. Even though r is exogenous to the model, we
can determine an upper bound for rwhich gives us a lower bound for the coordination
threshold θ∗, as well as a minimum market required haircut to sustain coordination at
any given θ
For any θ > θ∗, the gross payoff of an intermediary is given by θ(R − (1− k)r) when-
14
ever the project succeeds, and 0 otherwise. Since the intermediary invests ψ, its gross
payoff in the success state must exceed ψ as otherwise the intermediary would neces-
sarily receive a strictly negative net expected payoff for any θ > θ∗. Thus a necessary
condition for the intermediary to run the project at all is4
θ∗(R− (1− ψ)r) > ψ.
Changing the inequality to an equality and solving for r gives us the following upper
bound on r:
rmax = 1+
R− 1
1− ψ(1− ψ)(1− p)
.
Using this upper bound, we can get a lower bound on the value of θ∗, denoted by θ∗min:
θ∗min =
1− ψ(1− ψ)(1− p)
R− (1− p)(1− ψ)(R− (1− ψ)).
We can now calculate the minimum market required haircut to sustain coordination
at any given θ using the same logic as in the derivation of ψM(θ) above. Since θ∗min is
decreasing in ψ, the haircut is smallest if we can ensure coordination is just successful at
θ. If we support coordination at θ by making θ > θ∗min, we can lower the intermediary’s
own stable funding and still ensure that θ > θ∗min. Therefore the minimum haircut
necessary to ensure θ > θ∗min is given by the solution for ψ to θ = θ
∗
min. From this, we
get
ψMmin(θ) =
1
2(1− θ)
A−
√
(1− p)A2 + 4(1− θ)
(
(R− (1− p)(R − 1))θ − 1
)
1− p

where
A = (1− θ) + θ(R− 1)
4In equilibrium we must have piI(θ
∗) > 0. Suppose, on the contrary, that piI(θ
∗) < 0 in equilibrium.
Then there is a positive measure of values of θ > θ∗ for which piI(θ) < 0. Note also that both θ
∗ and piI(·)
are decreasing in r. If the intermediary sets a slightly lower r, its payoff would increase for all values of
θ > θ∗, and further, θ∗ would increase a little, therefore reducing the measure of the set of values of θ
for which payoff is negative. Thus such a reduction in r is strictly profitable for the intermediary. This
contradiction proves that in equilibrium we must have piI(θ
∗) > 0. Given this, an upper bound on r is
given by θ∗(R− r(1− ψ))− ψ = 0.
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3.3 Inefficiency
The upper bound for r derived above also gives a lower bound for the inefficiency gen-
erated in the loan rollover problem considered here. A lower bound on the inefficiency
generated by the coordination problem among lenders is given by
max{0, θ∗min − θfb}.
Proposition 2. If ψ < 1 so that there is some short term borrowing, θ∗min > θfb. In other
words, an inefficiency arises from coordination. As ψ → 1, θ∗min − θfb → 0.
Proof: It is straightforward to see that limψ→1 θ
∗
min = 1/R = θfb. This proves the
second part of the proposition. Next, note that
∂θ∗min
∂ψ
= −
1
D2
((1− p)(R − 1)((1− ψ)(2− (1− p)(1− ψ)))) < 0,
where D = R− (1− ψ)(1− p)(R − (1− ψ)). Further, θfb is independent of ψ. There-
fore, as ψ falls from 1, θ∗min rises above θfb. This proves the first part of the proposition.‖
Thus efficiency is achieved onlywhen the bank funds the entire project from own stable
funds without any short term borrowing. Whenever some short term borrowing is
required, so that there is a positive amount requiring to be rolled over, there is an
inefficiency arising from the coordination problem.
4 Ambiguity and Sudden Jumps in Market Required Haircut
In this section I show that if p < 1 for a financial institution (the market is not certain
that the institution would be rescued if it became illiquid in period 1), when environ-
ment is characterized by ambiguity (signal is ambiguous) and agents are ambiguity
averse, coordination breaks down completely.
Suppose some investors face a slight ambiguity about the quality of their own signal.
Specifically, suppose some investors think that their signal might have some (arbitrar-
ily small) bias relative to the signals received by others. In other words, such an in-
vestor i regards the signal as being
xi = θ + βi + εi
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where βi ∈ [−b, b], and b > 0. In other words, each buyer believes that the signal they
receive is drawn from some distribution from a set of distributions with means θ + βi,
where the bias βi is distributed over [−b, b]. Note that b can be arbitrarily small, so that
the extent of the ambiguity could be vanishingly small.
The preferences of the buyers is represented by the maxmin expected utility model
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Following their model, ambiguity averse investors
maximize their minimum expected utility over the set of possible signal distributions.
Here, the minimizing signal distribution for investor i is the one with mean θ + b.
Investor i therefore chooses the cutoff xi to maximize expected utility conditional on
signal xi = θ + b+ εi .
ui(xi, θ
∗) =
1
2ε
∫ xi−b+ε
θ∗
θrdθ +
1
2ε
∫ θ∗
xi−b−ε
(pθr + (1− p)θ)dθ − 1
Integrating and rearranging terms, we get
ui(xi, θ
∗) =
1
4
(r− 1)(1− p)
(
(xi − b)
2 − θ∗2
ε
+ ε
)
+
1
2
(1− p+ r(1+ p))(xi − b)− 1 (8)
Let y∗ be the rollover signal threshold for all others. We want to see the relation be-
tween xi and y
∗. In the standard case without ambiguity there would be a common
threshold xi = y
∗. In this case, θ∗ and y∗ are such that L(θ∗|y∗) = 1− ψ. Using equa-
tion (4), this implies,
θ∗ + ε− y∗
2ε
= 1− ψ.
Solving, we get θ∗ = y∗ + ε− 2ψε. Substituting the value of θ∗, we get payoff in terms
of xi and y
∗:
ûi(xi, y
∗) =
1
4
(1− p)(r − 1)
(
(xi − b)
2 − y∗2
ε
− 2y∗(1− 2ψ)− ε(1− 2ψ)2 + ε
)
+
1
2
(xi − b)(1− p+ r(1+ p))− 1 (9)
Suppose p < 1. If xi − b > y
∗, for small ε, the payoff becomes large and positive, so
that xi must be lower in equilibrium. Thus xi − b 6> y
∗. Also, if xi − b < y
∗, for small
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ε, the payoff is large and negative, so that the cutoff xi of investor i must be higher.
Therefore xi − b 6< y
∗. It follows that the only value of xi compatible with equilibrium
is given by xi − b = y
∗, implying xi = y
∗ + b.
In other words, investor i invests above a signal cutoff that is above the cutoff of others.
If all others invest above cutoff y∗, i invests above cutoff y∗ + b. But since everyone
behaves this way, it is impossible to have an interior solution for y∗. In other words,
coordination only succeeds when it is a dominant strategy to rollover, i.e. when θ >
θ. Otherwise coordination fails. Thus for the entire set of fundamentals for which
coordination matters, coordination collapses.
Note that this is a discontinuous collapse. As shown earlier, without ambiguity there
is an interior threshold θ∗ beyond which coordination succeeds. Starting from this
position if we introduce even the slightest degree of ambiguity in signals, coordination
collapses completely and θ∗ jumps to θ.
Any financial intermediary for which the rescue probability is p = 1, coordination is
irrelevant. However, for any other value of p, coordination collapses under any degree
of ambiguity and there is a run by short term investors.
The calculations and discussion above prove the following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose bi > 0 for all i so there is some (possibly arbitrarily small) ambiguity
across all lenders. For any p < 1 coordination breaks down completely.
Next, suppose a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of lenders are sensitive to ambiguity. It follows from
the result above that if there is any ambiguity in signals, this fraction of agents would
not be useful for coordination - if others already establish some success threshold θ∗,
each ambiguity-sensitive agent would want to rollover debt beyond a cutoff above θ∗.
However, θ∗ itself must be established by relying on the fraction (1− α) of ambiguity-
insensitive agents only. It follows that equation (3) becomes
(1− α)L(θ∗) = 1− ψ.
Since L(θ∗) 6 1, it is clear that coordination cannot succeed if α > ψ. This proves the
following result:
Proposition 4. For any α > ψ, coordination breaks down completely.
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4.1 Ambiguity and Haircut
An interior coordination cutoff θ̂∗ can be obtained if α < ψ.
As noted above, equation (3) now becomes
(1− α)L(θ̂∗) = 1− ψ.
Equation (5) is unchanged. Following the same steps as above, we get the rollover
threshold:
θ̂∗ =
1− α
r(1− α)− (r − 1)(1− ψ)(1− p)
.
The maximum gross payment to debt holders in period 2 if the project succeeds is
r̂max =
ψ(1− ψ)(1− p)− R(1− α)
ψ(1− ψ)(1− p)− (1− α)
.
Finally, the lowest value of cutoff that can be sustained given any specific α is
θ̂∗min =
ψ(1− ψ)(1− p)− (1− α)
(R− 1+ ψ)(1− ψ)(1− p)− R(1− α)
.
Figure 1 below plots θ̂∗min as a function of ψ for different values of α. For α = 0, θ̂
∗
min
coincides with θ∗min calculated in the case without ambiguity. The figure also shows the
case of α = 0.4. Now, for ψ < 0.4 coordination breaks down completely, and then for
higher values of ψ, we get lower values of θ̂∗min.
We can also use this to find the minimum haircut needed to sustain coordination at
any given θ. The least-demanding way of sustaining any given θ is to achieve it as the
cutoff θ̂∗.
Given any α, the Y-axis shows the lowest value of θ̂∗ that can be sustained for any ψ.
We can invert this to find the lowest value of haircut needed to sustain any given θ as
θ̂∗. This can be done simply by setting θ = θ̂∗min and solving for ψ. In the picture, if we
take any θ on the Y-axis, then the corresponding value of ψ on the X-axis is the lowest
value of haircut that can support θ as θ̂∗.
The dashed line shows, given a particular θ (in this case θ = 0.7), the minimum haircut
required to sustain coordination at 0.7 for different values of α. If α is 0, this is around
0.33. However if α = 0.4 (so that 40% of lenders are ambiguity-sensitive), at the advent
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Figure 1: The lowest possible coordination threshold θ̂∗min as a function of ψ for different values
of α.
of ambiguity the minimum haircut to sustain θ = 0.7 jumps up to around 0.55. Thus
given that some fraction of lenders are ambiguity averse, there is a sudden increase in
haircut at the advent of ambiguity. Of course, if α exceeds the available stable funds ψ,
the haircut jumps up all the way to 100%.
5 Conclusion
I show coordination is fragile in an environment with ambiguity. In such an environ-
ment, policy itself is a systemic trigger. If the regulator fails to rescue an institution
that the market expects the regulator to rescue, this can trigger a systemic collapse of
liquidity.
I determine the equilibrium market haircut and show how the haircut responds to
various parameters. The haircut depends on the rate of return promised by the bor-
rower to the lenders. To eliminate the influence of this variable, which is potentially
an endogenous variable, I calculate the minimum market haircut subject to the bor-
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rower’s participation constraint. The minimum haircut depends on purely exogenous
variables.
Next, I show how the market haircut (as well as the minimum market haircut) re-
sponds to the presence of ambiguity. I show that if there is even a very slight degree
of ambiguity and lenders are ambiguity averse, coordination breaks down completely,
implying that haircut rises to 100%. This also shows that coordination in general is
fragile in the presence of ambiguity. The result does not require all lenders to be am-
biguity averse - any fraction above a critical threshold is enough for coordination to
break down completely. When the fraction of ambiguity sensitive agents are below
this critical threshold, coordination weakens but does not break down completely, so
that the equilibrium market haircut rises sharply, but stops short of 100%. I calculate
the market haircut and the minimum market haircut in this case and show how the
haircut jumps up when an arbitrarily small degree of ambiguity is introduced.
The breakdown in coordination would not happen if the lenders expect the borrow-
ing financial intermediary to be rescued by the central bank (or some other liquidity
provider of last resort). Such intermediaries would be immune to the problem of ambi-
guity and coordination as no coordination is needed for such institutions to be able to
roll over borrowing successfully. However, if some policy signal arrives that changes
the market expectation about rescue probability even slightly, the problem reappears
and there is again a breakdown of coordination implying a sharp rise inmarket haircut.
Such a policy signal can arrive if, for example, the regulators do not rescue a financial
institution that the market expected to be rescued. Thus policy itself can trigger a sys-
temic liquidity crisis.
The results imply that in the presence of short term borrowing, and the possibility
of ambiguity arising in a downturn through factors such as complex security design
and/or unknown exposures of financial intermediaries to problematic assets, rescue
policy cannot be determined independently of market expectations if a systemic liq-
uidity crisis is to be avoided.
Further, in the context of systemic crises, what matters is whether an institution is
too-unexpected-to-fail. If markets expect large intermediaries interconnected to many
other institutions (TBTF) to be TUTF, then TBTF coincides with TUTF. In this case, to
the extent that an intermediary is TBTF, it helps limit the spread of a liquidity crisis.
Indeed, if a TBTF institution is broken up into smaller pieces so that none of the pieces
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are TUTF, this increases systemic vulnerability. Thus policies advocating breaking up
TBTF institutions may be somewhat misplaced.
A similar reasoning casts doubt on the efficacy of the ring-fencing proposed by the UK
banking commission. Such a policy indicates to markets that the part outside the ring
fence is unlikely to be rescued in a crisis. Thus while a ring fence protects the core of a
bank, our results suggest that the market expectation that a rescue is unlikely for other
parts of the bank might increase systemic vulnerability.
Our results can generally be applied to understand situations where coordination mar-
kets break down suddenly. We hope to make further progress in analyzing richer mod-
els using this core idea.
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